The purpose of this course is to equip learners with the knowledge and practical analytical skills needed to apply economic theory, quantitative methods, and policy evaluation tools to real-world economic problems and decision-making in diverse applied fields.

• CLO1: Analyze advanced microeconomic theories of consumer choice, production, equilibrium, and uncertainty.
• CLO2: Evaluate strategic interaction, information structures, and welfare implications across game-theoretic,contractual, and market-design frameworks.
• CLO3: Design rigorous analytical solutions to applied problems in incentives, auctions, industrial organization, and public economics.
• CLO4: Synthesize microeconomic theory across diverse contexts to generate transferable insights for research,policy, and professional practice.

• Foundations of Advanced Microeconomic Theory: Understanding the analytical scope, purpose, and methodological foundations of advanced microeconomic theory; examining how formal economic reasoning explains the behaviour of consumers, firms, and institutions; exploring the relationship between optimization, equilibrium, and welfare; developing rigorous theoretical tools for analyzing allocation, incentives, and strategic interaction; and establishing the conceptual basis for advanced research in modern microeconomics; 
• Consumer Theory and Duality: Analyzing preferencesutility representation, budget constraints, and consumer choice; examining demand functions, indirect utility functions, and expenditure functions;applying duality theory to consumer optimization; studying compensated and uncompensated demand, Slutsky decomposition, and revealed preference; and evaluating consumer behaviour through formal demand systems and choice modelling frameworks; 
• Producer Theory and Duality: Examining production technologies, input combinations, and firm behaviour under alternative technological conditions; analyzing production sets, cost minimization, profit maximization, and supply decisions; applying duality relationships among production, cost, and profit functions; studying comparative statics in firm decision-making; and evaluating how technology and prices shape production efficiency and market outcomes; 
• General Equilibrium and Welfare Economics: Understanding exchange and production in general equilibrium settings; analyzing the conditions for competitive equilibrium, efficiency, and Pareto optimality; examining the First and Second Welfare Theorems and their implications for resource allocation; studying welfare comparisons and social allocation frameworks; and evaluating how equilibrium analysis informs questions of efficiency, distribution, and policy design; 
• Choice Under Risk and Ambiguity: Applying expected utility theory to decisions under uncertainty; examining risk preferences, attitudes toward lotteries, and measures of risk aversion; analyzing choice under ambiguity and alternative models of uncertain decision-making; studying the implications of risk and ambiguity for consumption, investment, and insurance decisions; and evaluating how uncertainty affects economic behaviour in both theoretical and applied contexts;
• Static and Dynamic Games: Analyzing strategic interaction among rational agents in static and dynamic environments; examining normal-form and extensive-form games, best responses, and equilibrium concepts; studying repeated games, sequential decisions, commitment, and reputation dynamics; applying game-theoretic reasoning to competition, bargaining, and coordination problems; and evaluating how strategic structure shapes outcomes in markets and institutions; 
• Incomplete Information and Equilibrium Refinements: Examining games with asymmetric and incomplete information using Bayesian frameworks; analyzing beliefs, types, signaling, screening, and strategic uncertainty; studying Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and other refinement concepts; evaluating pooling, separating, and hybrid equilibria; and applying refinement tools to improve the predictive power and credibility of theoretical models; 
• Information Economics and Contract Theory: Exploring the role of information asymmetries in economic relationships; analyzing adverse selection, moral hazard, incentives, and principal-agent problems; studying the structure and performance of contracts under hidden information and hidden action; evaluating optimal incentive schemes and monitoring arrangements; and applying contract theory to labour markets, finance, insurance, regulation, and organizational design; 
• Mechanism Design and Auctions: Understanding the principles of mechanism design and implementation theory; analyzing how institutions and rules can be structured to achieve desired outcomes under private information; studying incentive compatibility, revelation principles, and optimal allocation mechanisms; examining auction formats, bidding strategies, revenue equivalence, and optimal auction design; and evaluating the application of mechanism design to public policy, procurement, and market design;
• Industrial Organization, Platform Economics and Market Failure: Applying advanced microeconomic theory to market structure, firm conduct, and strategic behaviour; examining monopoly, oligopoly, entry, product differentiation, and pricing strategies; studying network effects, multi-sided markets, and digital platform competition; analyzing strategic behaviour in traditional and digital industries; sources of market failure such as externalities, public goods, information asymmetries, and market power; and evaluating how industrial organization theory explains market power,innovation, and welfare in modern economies.